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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THESTATKOFU I AH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DENNIS ROSA-RE, : Case No. 20070305-SC 
Case No. 20060432-CA 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This I 'otnl gntnled Dennis Rosa-Re's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals in State v. Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91, 2007 WL 772769 (attached as 
Addendum A). The Court's Order granting the Petition is attached as Addendum B. 
Jurisdiction is eonfiTp1'! on Ibis Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(5) and 78-
2a-4(2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REV TEW 
Statement of the Issue: " Whether Petitioner's Batson challenge was timely." See 
Addendum B, hereto. 
Standard of Review: 
On certiorari, "we review the decision of the court of appeals, and not that of the 
district court." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, Tf25, 63 P.3d 650 (citation omitted). 
Whether [petitioner's] Batson challenge was timely raised is a question of law. 
We review questions of law for correctness, granting no deference to the legal 
conclusions of the court of appeals. Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt, 2004 UT 
124 9, 84P.3d1?01. 
State v. Valdez* 2006 UT 39, | 1 1 , 140 P.3d 1219. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
At trial, Petitioner Rosa-Re challenged the state's use of peremptory strikes 
pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), before the trial court empaneled a 
jury and dismissed the remainder of the venire. The timely Batson challenge is contained 
in the record on appeal at 146:38-43 and 164 (attached as Addendum C). Also, the court 
of appeals addressed the timeliness issue in an unpublished Memorandum Decision, 
dated March 15, 2007. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91 (attached as Addendum A). 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to the 
issue on review. It is attached as Addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On April 1, 2005, the state filed an information against Rosa-Re for forcible 
sexual abuse, a second degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (2003), 
and child abuse, a class A misdemeanor offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 
(2003). (R. 1-3). In March 2006, the trial court presided over a jury trial in the matter. 
(R. 146). At the conclusion, the jury rendered a guilty verdict on the felony offense and 
an acquittal on the misdemeanor offense. (R. 114). 
On May 8, 2006, the trial court sentenced Rosa-Re to a term of one to fifteen years 
at the Utah State Prison. (R. 131-32). Rosa-Re appealed. (R. 133). He raised an issue 
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), claiming that the prosecutor engaged in 
discrimination when he used peremptory strikes to remove three men, who presumptively 
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would sit on the jury. See. Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91 (stating defendant's argument "is 
that the State improperly exercised its peremptory challenges to remove males from the 
jury in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution"). 
On March 15, 2007, the court of appeals ruled. It stated that Rosa-Re failed to 
"resolve his" Batson challenge in a timely manner in the trial court, and it refused to 
address Rosa-Re's Bats on issue on the merits. Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91. Rosa-Re 
petitioned for review in this Court. This Court granted the petition. (See Addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The state presented the following evidence at trial in this case. Edgardo Rameriz 
and Lidea Bolanos lived in Kearns on Silvertip Drive with Lidea's sons Moses and then 
15-year-old Joshua. (See R. 146:99, 101-02 (stating Lidea also had a son, Christian); 
146:133). Joshua wore hearing aids. (R. 146:85). Edgardo was in the 
transportation/trucking business. (R. 146:100, 109, 133). 
On March 28, 2005, Edgardo arranged for Rosa-Re and a second man, Neftole, to 
spend the night at his house. (R. 146:54-55,58-59,115,135-140). The men were 
planning to leave town early the next morning. (See R. 146:117). 
Neftole slept in a spare room downstairs next to Joshua's room. (R. 146:60). 
Rosa-Re "was supposed to sleep" there too. (R. 146:57). According to Joshua, when he 
showed the spare room to Rosa-Re, he said "no, he said he didn't want to, he wanted to 
sleep in my bedroom. He was going to sleep on half of the bed." (R. 146:60). Joshua had 
a queen-sized bed. (R. 146:60). Joshua slept on the left side of the bed, and Rosa-Re 
slept on the right side. (R. 146:61). 
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Joshua testified, "I was sleeping and, you know, dreaming, I don't remember what 
I dreamt about. Then I felt someone grab my body and then I didn't feel it." (R. 146:61). 
He also explained, fl[it] felt like someone was going down my leg and grabbed my dick 
and my balls and then the other hand came in down this way and touched it hard." (R. 
146:63). Joshua testified that Rosa-Re turned him onto his back spread open his legs and 
was touching his "dick" and "balls" under his shorts and "skin-to-skin." (R. 146:61-63, 
91-92). According to Joshua, Rosa-Re grabbed and pulled his genitals hard until they 
hurt. (R. 146:61-62, 63, 66). Joshua tried to get up twice, but Rosa-Re forced him down 
by pressing hard on his chest. (R. 146:64, 77, 92). According to Joshua, Rosa-Re told 
him not to tell anyone or he would kill him or his parents. (R. 146:62, 64, 92). 
Joshua testified that he "kind of choked up" and "watched the wall." (R. 146:64, 
78). When he was able, he broke away, grabbed his hearing aids from the nightstand and 
ran upstairs (R. 146:92), to his brother's room. (R. 146:64-65, 78). 
Rosa-Re went to Edgardo and Lidea's bedroom, and knocked on the door to wake 
Edgardo. (R. 146:65, 105). He told Edgardo it was time to leave. (R. 146:65, 105). 
After the men left, Joshua told his mother what happened and called the police. 
(R. 146:65,66,79). The police ultimately arrested Rosa-Re. (SeeR. 146:123-24, 126, 
149). Joshua went to a doctor (R. 146:66, 108), and saw that his genitals were red. (R. 
146:67). Also, he had a hand mark on his chest. (R. 146:67, 107). 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Rosa-Re of forcible sexual abuse, and 
acquitted him of child abuse. (R. 146:211). On May 8, 2006, the trial court sentenced 
Rosa-Re to a term of one to fifteen years in prison. (R. 147:8-9). He is incarcerated. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah law, a defendant making a Batson challenge at trial must raise 
the issue before the jury is sworn and before the remainder of the venire is excused. In 
this case, Petitioner Rosa-Re raised a Batson challenge immediately after the parties 
exercised peremptory strikes and before the trial court announced the jury panel and 
excused the remainder of the venire. Notwithstanding, the trial court delayed in resolving 
the Batson challenge until after it had empaneled a jury and excused the remaining venire 
members. The trial court delay was to the detriment of Rosa-Re. Indeed, the court of 
appeals refused to address the Batson issue on the merits, and instead ruled that Rosa-
Re's challenge was untimely because "trial counsel failed to conclude a Batson challenge 
prior to the empaneling of the jury." Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91. 
The court of appeals' ruling is in error. Rosa-Re raised a timely Batson challenge. 
Since the trial court failed to resolve the challenge until later, that constitutes trial court 
error. Rosa-Re respectfully requests that this Court reverse the court of appeals' ruling 
with regard to the timeliness of the Batson challenge. 
ARGUMENT 
ROSA-RE MADE A TIMELY CHALLENGE UNDER BATSON V. 
KENTUCKY, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), IN A SIDEBAR CONFERENCE DURING 
JURY SELECTION, BEFORE THE JURY WAS SWORN AND THE 
REMAINDER OF THE VENIRE WAS EXCUSED. THE TRIAL COURT, 
HOWEVER, WAITED TO RESOLVE THE MATTER UNTIL LATER. 
A. BATSON PROTECTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION IN 
JURY SELECTION ON THE BASIS OF RACE OR GENDER. IF A PARTY 
MAKES A BATSON CHALLENGE AND OBJECTS TO THE GOVERN-
MENT'S USE OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES IN JURY SELECTION, THE 
TRIAL COURT WILL APPLY A THREE-PART TEST TO THE MATTER. 
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During jury selection, a party may exercise peremptory strikes for "any reason, or 
for no reason at all." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, ^ [6, 41 P.3d 1153. However, it is 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution for a party to strike 
prospective jury members from the venire based on race or gender. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994); see also State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App'305, f28, 
989 P.2d 503; Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3 (2002); U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
According to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and its progeny, the Equal 
Protection Clause protects criminal defendants, prospective jurors, and society against 
government-sponsored discrimination in the jury selection process. "When persons are 
excluded from participation in our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, 
[the] promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized." 
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146; see also Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 17 (stating litigants are entitled to 
jury selection using nondiscriminatory methods; jurors are entitled to nondiscriminatory 
procedures; and the "community has an interest in fair jury selection procedures"). 
To determine whether a peremptory strike violates equal protection under Batson, 
Utah courts apply a three-part test. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 15 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 
93-97). This test applies in cases of gender discrimination. 
The first part of the test considers whether "the opponent" of the peremptory strike 
- i.e., the defense - has established "a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in 
the selection of the petit jury." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, |15 (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 
765, 767 (1995); State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ffl[17-18, 994 P.2d 177). That is, the 
defense must show that the prosecutor engaged in racial or gender discrimination in 
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striking potential jurors from the venire. See e.g.. Bats on, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (holding that 
a pattern of striking members of a cognizable group may give rise to an inference of 
discrimination). 
This first part of the test is met in cases where the prosecutor has not specifically 
contested "the sufficiency of the [defendants] prima facie case" for discrimination. State 
v. Hizzinbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996); see Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^[18. In that 
instance, the defendants prima facie case may be deemed sufficient, and any claim by the 
prosecution to the contrary is waived for purposes of appeal. See. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 
\ 18. The analysis then continues to the second part of the test. 
Under the second part, "once the opponent [i.e., the defense] has established a 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the peremptory challenges [i.e., the 
prosecutor] to rebut the prima facie case by offering neutral, nondiscriminatory 
justifications for the peremptory challenges." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 15 (citing Batson, 
476 U.S. at 97; Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1J19). 
A proponent cannot meet this burden by simply denying a discriminatory motive 
or professing good faith. Batson. 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Rather, a 
proponent must proffer justifications that are: (1) neutral; (2) related to the 
particular case to be tried; (3) reasonably specific and clear; and (4) legitimate. 
See id. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("[T]he prosecutor must give a 'clear and 
reasonably specific5 explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the 
challenges." (quoting Texas Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Bur dine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 
101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981))); State v. Hizzinbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 
548 (Utah 1996) (listing the four factors discussed above) (citations omitted). 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39,^15. 
Under the third part of the test, if the prosecutor "provides a sufficient explanation 
for the peremptory challenges," the trial court must decide whether the defense "has 
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proven purposeful discrimination." Id. at ^ 15 (footnote and cites omitted). In short, 
under the three-part test, the party raising the Batson challenge must articulate a prima 
facie case for discrimination; the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to give neutral 
reasons for his actions; finally, the trial court must decide the matter. See kL 
In this case, the three-part test is relevant to the timeliness issue where Petitioner 
Rosa-Re properly raised an objection under Batson and specified that the challenge 
concerned gender discrimination. (See R. 164:38). However, the trial court did not 
proceed with the analysis and then final resolution until later. (See R. 146:38-42). Given 
the fact that the analysis recognizes a burden shifting and requires the trial court to decide 
the matter, the court of appeals erred when it ruled that Rosa-Re's objection was 
untimely. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91. Indeed, Rosa-Re was the only party to take 
action in a timely manner in this case. 
B. ONCE A BATSON CHALLENGE IS RAISED, THE TRIAL COURT MUST 
RESOLVE IT. 
1. A Defendant Must Raise an Objection Under Batson Before the Jury Is Sworn 
and the Remainder of the Venire is Excused. 
In considering the timeliness of a Batson challenge, this Court recently ruled: 
[A] Batson challenge is only timely if raised both before the jury is sworn and 
before the remainder of the venire is excused. Under firmly established Utah law, 
a Batson challenge is only timely if it is raised before the jury is sworn. We take 
the opportunity provided by this case to clarify that a Batson objection must also 
be raised before the venire is dismissed. 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 2; see also id at ffl[26, 42-43, 46. In Vqldez, counsel waited until 
after a jury had been empaneled, the remainder of the venire had been excused, and the 
jury had been sworn, instructed, and dismissed for lunch to raise a Batson challenge for 
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the first time. M a t f 4 . This Court considered that to be untimely. Id. a t f ! 2 . 
It articulated the importance of timeliness in conjunction with the three-part test. 
It stated the Batson procedure would be severely impeded if a challenge were to be raised 
"after the jury selection process is complete. The burden-shifting framework of Batson is 
best implemented if it is litigated while the peremptory strikes are fresh in the minds of 
both the court and the litigants." IcL_ at ^[42. That is, the party making the challenge will be 
better equipped if he raises the issue "sooner rather than later." M at ^43 (note omitted). 
Also, the Court specified that timely raised objections allow for an efficient and 
effective process, appropriate remedies, and little disruption in the proceedings. See id_ at 
1fi[43, 44. Moreover, timely objections prevent "sandbagging," which may occur if the 
party making the challenge waits until after an unsuccessful trial to raise the issue. Id, at 
^[44; see also Ford v. Georgia. 498 U.S. 411, 422 (1991) (stating that the requirement 
that a Batson claim be raised "in the period between the selection of the jurors and the 
administration of their oaths, is a sensible rule"); Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 325-28 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (recognizing that at trial defendant twice indicated there were no problems 
with the jury even after repeated inquires by the trial court; thus, defendants Batson 
challenge raised "two years later" on appeal was not adequately preserved), cert, denied, 
543 U.S. 919 (2004); McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1247 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating 
that a Batson objection raised after the trial has begun would require aborting the trial; 
also such an objection would permit manipulation of the system to the prejudice of the 
prosecution and it would induce defendants to delay in raising the objection); U.S. v. 
Dobvnes, 905 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1990 ) (holding that a Batson challenge raised 
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for the first time after trial was untimely in part because the only remedy after trial would 
be to vacate the conviction), cert denied, 498 U.S. 877 (1990); US. v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 
1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating the timely objection rule prevents defendants from 
sandbagging); State v. Heiskell 896 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing 
that defense counsel waited until "jeopardy had attached" with the statefs first witness 
before making a Batson claim; thus, the issue was not timely preserved). 
The timely objection rule articulated in Valdez is consistent with the purposes 
served by Utah's preservation rule. In State v. Holzate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346, this 
Court stated that the preservation rule serves two important policies. 
First, "in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." Second, a 
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy 
of "enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, 
... claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." 
Id. at f l 1 (internal citations omitted). 
When a defendant with a Batson challenge makes an objection before the jury is 
sworn and the remainder of the venire is excused, the first policy consideration set forth 
in Holgate is satisfied. A timely objection "direct[s] the attention of the court to the 
claimed errors" so that the court "might have an opportunity to correct them." Tolman v. 
Winchester Hills Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (cites omitted) (discussing 
the rule for preservation in general); see also Valdez, 2006 UT 39, |^43 (recognizing that a 
timely objection allows the trial court to determine the Batson issue). 
Also, in that instance, the defendant is not seeking to circumvent the process or to 
sandbag anyone. Indeed, he has not delayed in making his objection for any reason. 
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Thus, the second policy consideration set forth in Holzate is satisfied: the defendant has 
not delayed in "making an objection with the strategy of 'enhancing his] chances of 
acquittal and then, if that strategy fails," claiming error on appeal. See Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, Tfl 1 (citation omitted). Once a defendant has timely raised his objection, it is up to 
the trial court to resolve it. 
2. The Trial Court Must Resolve a Timely Objection. 
After a defendant has raised a Batson challenge to a prosecutors peremptory 
strikes, the trial court must continue with the analysis under the burden-shifting frame-
work of Batson. See, e.g., Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 15. In the face of a Batson challenge, 
"it is the duty of the trial court to apply the analytical framework set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Batson and its progeny, together with any elucidations thereof adopted by this 
Court, before the venireperson [who is the subject of the challenge] is removed from the 
panel." Parham v. Horace Mann Ins. Co.. 490 S.E.2d 696, 703 (W.Va. 1997). 
As stated above, the analytical framework includes the presentation of a prima 
facie case and a burden-shifting, where the proponent of the peremptory strikes is 
required to offer neutral, nondiscriminatory justifications for his actions. Valdez, 2006 
UT 39, ^ [15; (supra. Argument A., herein). The proponent of the peremptory strikes is 
more capable of offering justifications for his actions while the voir dire and the reasons 
for the strikes are "fresh in his mind." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, |43 . 
Thereafter, under the Batson process, see icL at 115 (stating that under the third 
step, the trial court must determine whether there was discrimination injury selection), 
the trial court must be prepared to fashion a proper remedy if discrimination is found. 
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See id. at^43. 
The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and 
inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process. In 
order to ensure that this framework produces actual answers, it is necessary that 
Batson challenges are promptly raised and that courts timely rule upon them. The 
rule we set forth, which requires that a Batson challenge be raised both before the 
jury is sworn and before the venire is dismissed, efficiently allows the trial court 
to determine the issues the Batson test is designed to resolve. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). 
Indeed, a trial court may not postpone the Batson process until later, since such an 
approach would prevent the court from taking proper corrective action in the face of 
prosecutorial discrimination. See, e.g.. State v. Robinson, 676 A.2d 384, 391-92 (Conn. 
1996) (ruling that a defendant must voice an objection under Batson before the jury is 
sworn, and the trial court must promptly resolve it; where the trial court failed to hold a 
proper Batson hearing, the remedy is a new trial). 
[For the trial court to postpone] consideration of a Batson claim until the trial is in 
progress, or even completed, as in this case, risks infecting what would have been 
the prosecutor's spontaneous explanations with contrived rationalizations, and may 
create a subtle pressure for even the most conscientious district judge to accept 
explanations of borderline plausibility to avoid the only relief then available, a 
new trial. Cf. United States v. Tunnessen, 763 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(requiring contemporaneous statement of "ends of justice" continuance under 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1988) to guard against risk that district judge "may 
simply rationalize his action long after the fact"). 
U.S. v. Biaeei, 909 F.2d 662, 679 (2d Cir. 1990), cert, denied. 499 U.S. 904 (1991); see 
also id^ (stating "Batson objections should be entertained and adjudicated during the 
process of jury selection1'; the district court's preference for written motions "must give 
way to the need to resolve a Batson claim at the point where prompt corrective action can 
be taken if the claim is successful"). 
12 
[A] delay in requiring a striking party to articulate its reasons for exercising a 
peremptory strike until after the trial is completed fails to vindicate the rights of 
any venireperson wrongfully excluded from sitting on a jury. See Missouri v. 
Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (stating that even when the 
panel is quashed and the jury selection process begins anew, it "does not really 
correct the error.... [T]he discrimination endured by the excluded venirepersons 
goes completely unredressed since they remain wrongfully excluded from jury 
service."). On the other hand, an immediate resolution of a Batson challenge will 
provide the trial court with the opportunity to disallow a discriminatory 
peremptory strike, protecting the equal protection rights of the venireperson along 
with the equal protection rights of the non-striking party. This approach promotes 
judicial economy by addressing meritorious claims without the necessity of 
awarding a new trial. See ici This approach also permits the striking party to 
articulate its reason for exercising the peremptory strike while the facts are fresh in 
the minds of all the participants, and it reduces the appearance that the striking 
party had time to fabricate its reason for using the strike. See id. at 938. 
Parham v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 490 S.E.2d 696, 703 (W.Va. 1997). Timely resolution 
of a Batson challenge is critical to the process. 
In this case, Rosa-Re timely raised a Batson challenge. However, the trial court 
waited to resolve the matter until later. That was error. 
C. THE OBJECTION IN THIS CASE COMPLIED WITH VALDEZ AND WITH 
UTAH LAW CONCERNING PRESERVATION. 
In this case, the defense raised a Batson challenge before the trial court empaneled 
a jury, before the jury was sworn, and before the remainder of the venire was excused. 
(See R. 146:38, line 15 (reflecting sidebar); 164:38). Specifically, on March 14, 2006, 
the trial began with jury selection. (See R. 146:2). After the trial court and attorneys 
conducted voir dire and dealt with challenges for cause (see R. 146:2-33; see also 78-79 
(reflecting venire members who were stricken for cause)), the trial court gave the 
attorneys the opportunity to exercise peremptory strikes. (See R. 146:33; see also 78-79). 
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At that point in the process, the list of 16 potential jurors included the following: 
[2] Boyd Tidwell 
[5] Dorothy Vlamakis 
[7] Janet Anderson 
[11 
[14 
[15 
[16 
[17 
[18 
[19 
[20 
[21 
[23 
[24 
[25 
[28 
Tamera Sollis 
Jed Worley 
Darrell Jensen 
Judy Dearden 
Connie Iverson 
Paul Braun 
Jonathan Peay 
Janae Beausheur 
Jeffrey Mace 
June Christenson 
Teri Pearce-Rich 
Angela Avila 
Carl Stechschulte. 
(R. 78-79) (emphasis added). 
Immediately after the parties had exercised their peremptory strikes, the defense 
requested a sidebar conference. (See R. 146:38). The sidebar conference was transcribed 
and is contained in the record on appeal. (See R. 164). The relevant portions of the 
record are attached hereto as Addendum C. 
During the sidebar conference, defense counsel advised the trial court that given 
the seriousness of the sexual assault charges, ffwefre probably going to need the record to 
make a Batson challenge." (R. 164:38). Counsel specified that of the sixteen remaining 
venire members, the prosecutor struck the top three men (id.), who presumptively would 
sit on the jury. (Id.) The men were [2] Body Tidwell, [14] Jed Worley, and [15] Darrel 
Jensen. (See R. 78). The prosecutor asked defense counsel to repeat his objection. (R. 
164:38). Defense counsel did. He stated, M[w]e had four potential male jurors and you 
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struck three." (Id.) He also specified that he needed the record for the challenge. (Id.) 
The prosecutor then explained that striking the men "wasn't intentional on my 
part." (Id); but see Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ [15 (stating it is not enough for the prosecutor 
to simply deny a discriminatory motive or to profess good faith). Defense counsel again 
stated that the parties needed the record for the analysis (R. 164:38 (stating "we just need 
to make a record and go through the . . .")), when the trial court interrupted to say, "Okay, 
alright, we can do that." (Id.) 
However, rather than "do that," the trial court proceeded to empanel a jury. (See 
R. 146:38-39). The trial judge read off the names of the seven-women, one-man jury 
panel and he asked defense counsel, "Mr. Misner and Ms. Chestnut [sic], is this the jury 
that you selected." (Id.) Defense counsel answered, "Yes, Your Honor, thank you." (Id.) 
Defense counsel's response was appropriate: the defense did not have an objection 
to those individuals. Rather, defendant had made an objection under Batson (R. 164:38) 
to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes, which constituted gender discrimination in the 
selection process in violation of the Equal Protection provision of the federal constitution. 
See U. S. Const, amend. XIV; see also J.E.B.* 511 U.S. at 146 (stating the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
"prohibits discrimination injury selection on the basis of gender"); Shepherd, 1999 UT 
App 305, f 28. The prosecutor's discriminatory actions violated Rosa-Re's constitutional 
rights as well as the rights of the wrongfully stricken venire members. See Valdez, 2006 
UT 39, ^ |17 (recognizing, among other things, that the Batson process protects 
prospective jurors from discrimination); Parham, 490 S.E.2d at 703. 
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After the jurors were sworn, the trial court excused the remainder of the venire and 
empaneled the jury; the court then turned to addressing the Batson challenge. (R. 
146:39). The court stated, "Okay, the jury is out of the courtroom and prospective jurors 
have left. Mr. Misner, if you [] want the benefit of the record at this point?" Defense 
counsel again stated that the prosecutor engaged in gender discrimination in the jury 
selection process when he removed the top three men, who presumptively would sit on 
the jury panel. (R. 146:39). 
The trial judge then asked the prosecutor to respond. (R. 146:40). The prosecutor 
stated his actions were "unintentional" and he "did not keep a tally of male versus fe-
male." (R. 146:40); but see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (stating a prosecutor's good faith is 
not enough to overcome a claim of discrimination). The prosecutor also pointed out that 
the defense struck the only minority member from the venire. (R. 146:40); but see J.E.B., 
511 U.S. at 129 (recognizing the state used all but one strikes on men, while defendant 
used all but one strikes on women; the state's actions constituted discrimination). 
The trial court and defense counsel then identified the three male venire members 
at issue: Tidwell, Worley and Jensen. (R. 146:40). And the trial court asked the parties 
to specify why they used peremptory strikes as they did. (R. 146:41). 
After defense counsel explained his reasons for striking venire members (see R. 
146:41; Brief of Appellee, October 27, 2006, at 20 (stating defense counsel's reasons 
were "legitimate")), the prosecutor explained that he struck Worley because he "was 
looking for somebody with some education, it wasn't there." (R. 146:41). Yet Worley 
did not disclose his educational background and he was not asked about it. He disclosed 
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that he read National Geographic and the newspaper. (R. 146:7). 
Next, the prosecutor struck Jensen - an executive officer to a corporation, and a 
person who had attended college, raised two children, and served previously on a jury (R. 
146:7, 18) - because it was his "personal opinion" that Jensen would not give the case 
"the necessary attention." (R. 146:41). And he struck Tidwell - an engineer, who had 
graduated from college, raised four children, and served previously on a jury (R. 146:2-3, 
17) - because it was his "gut instinct" that Tidwell "was not a person" who had "anything 
he could really bring to the jury panel." (R. 146:41-42). 
The prosecutor's reasons lacked specificity, legitimacy, and support in the record; 
they were vague and unrelated to the case. See, e.g., Vqldez, 2006 UT 39, Tfl5 (stating the 
prosecutor must proffer justifications that are "(1) neutral; (2) related to the particular 
case to be tried; (3) reasonably specific and clear; and (4) legitimate"); State v. Cantu, 
77'8 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that when the prosecutor's reasons for 
striking a venire member are unrelated to the case or are equally applicable to other 
members - who were not stricken - the reasons may constitute "an impermissible 
pretext" for discrimination) (citation omitted); U.S. v. Horslev. 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (stating the prosecutor's explanation that he struck a juror because "I just got a 
feeling about him," "obviously [fell] short" of being clear and specific); People v. 
BlackwelU 665 N.E.2d 782, 788 (111. 1996) (stating the "repeated use of vague, mistaken, 
and inconsistent explanations suggests that the State's reasons are pretextual"); J.E.B., 
511 U.S. at 142 n.13 (stating the "exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons 
harms that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system"). 
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After the prosecutor explained his reasons, the trial court asked defense counsel, 
"Okay, are you satisfied?" (R. 146:42). At that point, defense counsel advised the court 
to decide the issue: "Well, I think the record has been made, Your Honor, I think at this 
point the Court simply needs to decide either to uphold the panel or strike the panel." (R. 
146:42). Defense counsel's response was appropriate under the law. See Valdez, 2006 
UT 39,1f 15 (when a party makes a Batson challenge, under the third step of the analysis 
the trial court must decide if there was discrimination in the selection process). Counsel 
also advised the court that once it ruled, they could proceed in accordance with the ruling: 
"We're satisfied with whatever the Court's decision is." (R. 146:42). That response was 
appropriate under the law. See Utah R. Crim. P. 20 (2007) (stating that once a party has 
objected "[ejxceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary"; it is sufficient 
that the party has stated the objection and the reasons therefor); see also Salt Lake City v. 
Holtman, 806 P.2d 235, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing that once a defendant 
makes an objection, it is unnecessary to continue with the objection). 
The trial court then ruled as follows: 
Well, I have reviewed my notes that I took during the jury voir dire. I've looked at 
the pattern and way in which the peremptories were exercised by both sides. I do 
find that obviously it's a seven woman, one man jury, but based upon the reasons 
given and the conduct of both sides, I don't find a violation of Batson and [the] 
jury is constituted and the explanations given satisfy the Court that this jury may 
proceed. 
(R. 146:42-43). 
In this case, defense counsel raised the Batson issue in a timely manner - before 
the court empaneled the jury and excused the remainder of the venire - and specified that 
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the Batson challenge was based on gender discrimination. (See R. 146:38; 164). That 
objection was appropriate. See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ffl[2, 43; Holzate. 2000 UT 74, |11 
(identifying the policy considerations served by the preservation rule). Defense counsel 
did not seek to reserve an objection for later. In addition, counsel was not seeking to 
sandbag the court or prosecution; he was not seeking to manipulate the trial at an 
inopportune point at the conclusion of the case. Defense counsel raised the issue in time 
for the court to perform its function effectively and to fashion an appropriate remedy. 
(SeeR. 146:38; 164). 
Notwithstanding the timely objection, the trial court failed to follow the Batson 
three-part test until later. (See R. 146:39-42). Indeed, after defense counsel made the 
Batson objection and specified that the challenge concerned gender discrimination (R. 
164:38 (stating the prosecutor struck male jurors)), the trial court then announced the 
jurors to be empaneled, had them sworn in, and excused the sworn jury and the jury pool 
before resolving the matter under the Batson analysis. (R. 146:38-39). 
When the trial court returned to the Batson issue, it denied the challenge in part 
because the jury was already "constituted." (R. 146:42). The trial court's post hac 
rationalization was improper. See Vgldez, 2006 UT 39, ^ [44 (recognizing that if the 
venire has already been dismissed, a sustained Batson challenge will require the trial 
judge to call additional jurors, call an entirely new venire from which to select a new 
jury, or declare a mistrial); see also Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 679 (stating that a trial court's 
postponement of a Batson claim "may create a subtle pressure for even the most 
conscientious district judge to accept explanations of borderline plausibility to avoid the 
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only relief then available, a new trial"). 
The trial court was required to resolve the Batson challenge in a timely manner. 
See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, Tfl[42, 43, 44 (recognizing that the Batson process "rests on the 
premise that the trial court will hear the objection and make a factual finding"; stating "it 
is necessary" that challenges are promptly raised and "that courts timely rule upon them"; 
and stating that the Batson test "encourages prompt rulings on objections"); Parhgm, 490 
S.E.2d at 703; Biqggi, 909 F.2d at 679 (stating that a delay in resolving the Batson 
challenge "risks infecting" the process, and "may create a subtle pressure" for the trial 
court judge to accept "borderline" justifications for exercising peremptory strikes in order 
to avoid "the only relief then available, a new trial"). In this case it failed to do so. (See 
R. 146:38-39 (postponing resolution of the challenge until later)). That was error. 
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED THAT FOR A TIMELY OBJECTION. 
DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE A BATSON CHALLENGE 
BEFORE THE JURY WAS EMPANELED. YET THAT RULING 
DISREGARDS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
When Rosa-Re raised the Batson issue in the court of appeals, the court rejected 
the issue as untimely. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91. The court ruled that "Defendant's 
trial counsel failed to conclude a Batson challenge prior to the empaneling of the jury." 
Id. Also, it stated that "Defendant failed to resolve his objection to the makeup of the 
jury 'before the jury [was] sworn and before the remainder of the venire ha[d] been 
excused.'" I± (citing Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f47). 
The court of appeals seemed to require defense counsel to do more than make a 
Batson challenge as set forth in Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f43, for timely preservation. Indeed 
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the court of appeals required defense counsel to "conclude" or "resolve" the objection. 
Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91. That ruling is in error. 
Under the analytical framework of the Batson process, the party raising the chal-
lenge must make a prima facie case for discrimination. That is what Rosa-Re did. (See 
R. 146:38; 164 (making a Batson challenge due to prosecutor's use of preemptory strikes 
to remove men from the venire)). His objection was timely. See_ Valdez, 2006 UT 39, [^2. 
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to give gender-neutral reasons for 
his actions and the court must resolve the matter. See, e.g., Valdez, 2006 UT 39,1fl5; 
(also supra, pp. 6-8). The responsibility for resolving and concluding the Batson 
challenge is with the trial court. The Batson process "rests on the premise that the trial 
court will hear the objection " and make a determination in the matter. See Valdez, 2006 
UT 39, Tf42 (citation omitted; emphasis added). Also, "it is necessary" that trial courts 
"timely rule" on Batson challenges. Id_ at [^43 (emphasis added); see also Par ham, 490 
S.E.2d at 703; Biaezi* 909 F.2d at 679. 
According to the code of judicial conduct, it is the duty of the trial court to 
respond to objections, resolve matters, move them along, and maintain order and deco-
rum in proceedings. See. Utah Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3.B.(3) & (8) (2007). That 
obligation does not fall on the shoulders of defense counsel. See icL_ at Canon 3.B.(8) 
(requiring a judge to dispose of "all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly"). 
Defense counsel is not in a position to "conclude" or "resolve" (quoting Rosa-Re, 
2007 UT App 91) a Batson issue that he has raised. Indeed, if defense counsel were 
required to insist on a resolution or demand action from the trial court in the matter, that 
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would put trial counsel in an uncomfortable, possibly even contemptuous, posture with 
the court. 
In this case, the trial court delayed in resolving and concluding the Batson 
challenge. (SeeR. 146:38; 164). That was trial court error. Rosa-Re should not be 
penalized on appeal for that error. Indeed Rosa-Re timely raised the Batson challenge for 
preservation purposes. (See id.) He raised the challenge "before the jury [was] sworn 
and before the remainder of the venire [was] excused." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, [^2. 
Since Rosa-Re's objection was timely, the court of appeals should have addressed 
the merits of the Batson issue. It erred in failing to do that. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 
91. 
Finally, in holding defense counsel responsible for resolving Batson challenges in 
a timely manner, the court of appeals relied on this Court's discussion of Redd v. Negley, 
785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989). The court of appeals stated, "[T]he supreme court noted that 
the situation in Redd v. Nezley, 785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989), [']whereby an objection was 
made prior to the swearing of the jury but not addressed by the court until after the jury 
was sworn in and dismissed, will generally not meet the [timeliness] standard we set forth 
today.[']" Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91 (citing Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ [33 n.19). 
Rosa-Re maintains the court of appeals misapprehended this Court's language in 
Valdez concerning Redd. Indeed, the facts in Redd are distinguishable from this matter. 
In Redd, 785 P.2d 1098, before a jury was sworn, plaintiffs counsel approached 
the bench for a conference. See UL at 1099. The case does not reveal what happened 
during the bench conference. However, shortly after the conference and in connection 
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with swearing in the jury, the judge indicated that plaintiffs counsel had reserved "certain 
qualifications that we want to put on the record." Id. Based on that summary, it appeared 
that the plaintiff in Redd approached the bench to reserve an objection for later. See_ id, 
(where the trial court invited Reddfs counsel later to put "something" on the record 
"relative to the jury"). After the court later dismissed the jury for lunch, plaintiffs 
counsel made an "unsupported and vague oral objection" to the composition of the jury. 
Id. at 1099-1100. The trial court rejected the objection as untimely. M at 1100. This 
Court disagreed with the trial court ruling. 
This Court stated that plaintiffs actions in reserving the objection for later were 
sufficient for preservation purposes. Id^ at 1100. It approved of the procedure where 
plaintiff approached the bench to reserve an objection, then passed the jury for cause and 
later articulated the objection. See id. 
However, in Valdez, this Court appeared to retreat from the ruling in Redd. In a 
footnote, it stated that the procedure in Redd, "whereby an objection was made prior to 
the swearing of the jury but not addressed by the court until after the jury was sworn in 
and dismissed, will generally not meet the standard we set forth today." Valdez, 2006 UT 
39 ,p3n . l9 . 
A Batson challenge must be raised both before the jury is sworn and before the 
venire is dismissed in order to allow the trial court to adequately remedy a Batson 
violation if one has occurred. Obviously, if the grounds for the Batson challenge 
are not articulated until after the jury has been sworn and the remainder of the 
venire is dismissed, the trial court cannot cure a Batson violation. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
The footnote language in Valdez should not be construed to mean that the 
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defendant is responsible for resolving the objection before the jury is swom. Rather, the 
language should be read to place the responsibility of addressing/resolving an objection 
on the trial court. The trial court's procedure of waiting to address the objection until 
after the jury is sworn "will generally not meet the standard" in existence today. Id 
Thus, if a trial court postpones ruling on a timely objection, that is error. 
Here, defense counsel requested a bench conference, wherein he made a timely 
Batson challenge. (R. 164). Counsel specifically referenced Batson and objected to the 
prosecutor's actions as motivated by gender discrimination; he also requested trial court 
action. (See R. 164). The trial court heard the objection and agreed to resolve the matter 
(zdL), but failed to do so until later. (R. 146:39-43). Where the trial court failed to 
properly resolve the Batson challenge that was timely raised in this case, that constituted 
trial court error. The court of appeals' ruling should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner Dennis Rosa-Re respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the timeliness issue, and remand the 
case to the court of appeals for a decision on the merits of the Batson issue. 
SUBMITTED this 3rd day of Oc^o\)<?r ,2007. 
Linda M. Jones ff 
Michael Misner 
Heather Chesnut 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
DAVIS, Judge: 
*1 Defendant Dennis Rosa-Re appeals 
his conviction for forcible sexual abuse, 
a second degree felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-404(2003). We affirm. 
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is 
that the State improperly exercised its 
peremptory challenges to remove males 
from the jury in violation of the Equal 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
UTApp91 
Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution, see U.S. Const, amend. 
XIV, § 1: Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 
79, 89 (1986); see also J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) 
(holding that "the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits discrimination in jury 
selection on the basis of gender"); State 
v. Valdez. 2006 UT 39,1| If 13-19, 140 
P.3d 1219 (discussing history of Batson 
challenges). The State argues that 
Defendant's Batson challenge was 
untimely because it was not raised and 
addressed by the trial court before the 
jury was sworn and the venire dismissed. 
We agree. The question of whether 
Defendant's "Batson challenge was 
timely raised is a question of law," which 
we review for correctness. Valdez, 2006 
UT39at f 11. 
In State v. Valdez, the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that "a Batson 
challenge must be raised before the jury 
is sworn and before the remainder of the 
venire has been excused in order to be 
timely under Utah law." Id. at TJ 47. In 
reaching its holding, the supreme court 
noted that the situation in Redd v. 
Nezlev, 785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989), 
whereby an objection was made prior to 
the swearing of the jury but not 
addressed by the court until after the jury 
was sworn in and dismissed, will 
generally not meet the standard we set 
forth today. A Batson challenge must be 
raised both before the jury is sworn and 
before the venire is dismissed.... 
Obviously, if the grounds for the Batson 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in P.3d 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 772769 (Utah App.), 2007 UT App 91 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
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challenge are not articulated until after 
the jury has been sworn and the 
remainder of the venire is dismissed, the 
trial court cannot cure a Batson violation. 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39 at f 33 n. 19. Thus, 
in order to be timely, the grounds for a 
Batson challenge must be raised and 
addressed by the trial court prior to the 
swearing in of the jury and the dismissal 
of the venire. See also Mooney v. State, 
105 P .3d 149. 153 (Alaska 
Ct.App.2005) (aligning Alaska courts 
"with the courts that require defendants 
to raise Batson challenges before the 
remaining members of the jury venire are 
released and the jury is sworn"); State v. 
Parrisk 111 P.3d 671, 674 (Mont.2005) 
("[C]ounsel must raise a Batson 
challenge before the district court swears 
the jury and dismisses the venire."); see 
also Gaskin v. State, 873 So.2d 965, 968 
fMiss.2004). 
The rationale for such a bright line rule is 
clear. "[A] Batson challenge must be 
raised in such a manner that the trial 
court is able to fashion a remedy in the 
event a Batson violation has occurred." 
Valdez. 2006 UT 39 at f 44. Otherwise, 
"to allow a Batson challenge to proceed 
after the venire has been dismissed is 
only to sanction abuse." Id. Furthermore, 
the rule requiring "that a Batson 
challenge be raised [and ruled upon] both 
before the jury is sworn and before the 
venire is dismissed, efficiently allows the 
trial court to determine the issues the 
Batson test is designed to resolve." Id. at 
If 43. 
*2 Here, Defendants trial counsel failed 
to conclude a Batson challenge prior to 
the empaneling of the jury. In a sidebar 
conference, trial counsel stated "we're 
probably going to need the record to 
make a Batson challenge.... [BJecause of 
the sixteen perspective [sic] jurors that 
we had left after the for-causes, four 
were men, three were stricken by the 
[S]tate." After the brief sidebar 
discussion, the trial court read the names 
of the jurors, and both Defendant's trial 
counsel and the prosecutor affirmed that 
these jurors made up the jury that they 
had selected. The trial court then swore 
in the jury and released the remaining 
members of the venire. Other than 
raising the Batson issue in the side-bar 
conference, Defendant's trial counsel 
never objected to the makeup of the jury. 
After the swearing in of the jury and 
release of the venire, Defendant's trial 
counsel then argued his Batson 
challenge, which the trial court denied. 
Defendant's Batson challenge falls 
squarely within the holding and 
reasoning of Valdez. Defendant failed to 
resolve his objection to the makeup of 
the jury "before the jury [was] sworn and 
before the remainder of the venire ha[d] 
been excused." Id. at \ 47. As such, 
Defendant's Batson challenge was 
untimely, and we need not reach the 
merits of his claim. We therefore affirm 
Defendant's conviction. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Presiding Judge and CAROLYN B. 
McHUGH, Judge. 
Utah App.,2007. 
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AMENDED ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon 
certiorari, filed on April 13, 2007. 
a Petition for Writ of 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue: 
Whether Petitioner's Batson challenge was timely. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
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1 After the instructions have been read, the State and the 
2 defense will once again have the opportunity to make closing 
3 statements to you to tell you what they think the evidence 
4 did show and why you should be persuaded or not be persuaded 
5 based on certain elements of the evidence. 
6 As you try the case as jurors, you should remain 
7 alert and attentive and again not express an opinion until 
8 all of the evidence is in, until you've been asked to do so 
9 by retiring to the jury room not to discuss the case with 
10 anyone and not talk to the attorneys or read or review 
11 anything else about the case. Okay, when I read your names, 
12 if you would please stand. 
13 MR. ?: Your Honor, (inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: Sure. 
15 (Whereupon a sidebar was held) 
16 THE COURT: Dorothy Faranakis, Janet Anderson, 
17 Tamara Solis, Judy Dearden, Connie Iverson, Janae Brochear, 
18 Terry Pierce-Rich, Carl [inaudible]. 
19 MR. JOHNSON: Can we approach a moment, Judge? 
20 (Whereupon a sidebar was held) 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, is this the jury which 
22 you've selected? 
23 MR, JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: And Mr. Misner and Ms. Chestnut, is 
25 this the jury that you selected? 
1 MR. MISNER: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. 
2 THE COURT: Okay, will you each raise your right 
3 hand please? 
4 (Whereupon the jurors were sworn.) 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. If the eight of you would 
6 please come with the bailiff. He will show you the jury room 
7 and you can get settled and we'll start in about 15 minutes. 
8 And the remainder of you we want to thank you for 
9 being here, for coming, your attendance and we will excuse 
10 you at this time. 
11 (Whereupon the jury and the jury pool left the courtroom) 
12 THE COURT: Okay, the jury is out of the courtroom 
13 and prospective jurors have left. 
14 Mr. Misner, if you have want the benefit of the 
15 record at this point? 
16 MR. MISNER: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. 
17 We would just want to challenge the jury that's 
18 selected based on the Batson challenge, Your Honor. After 
19 for cause after looking at the top 16 jurors left which would 
20 be the only eligible jurors to choose from, four of those 16 
21 prospective jurors were men, three of them were stricken by 
22 the State. 
23 THE COURT: Okay, and your point being? 
24 MR. MISNER: Just that it appears that the State is 
25 attempting to strike men from the jury under Batson that 
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gender is a protected class with rights to serve on the jury 
and there has to be certainly an alternative valid and 
verifiable reason given for each strike once the Batson 
challenge has been made. 
THE COURT: Mr. Johnson? 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, Judge, it was totally 
unintentional on the State's part. I did not keep a tally of 
male versus female and it should be interested to note that 
the victim on this case is a male, so it doesn't seem that 
that would quite comport with that. 
I would also hasten to add that if the Batson 
challenge is raised, there was only one other individual of 
color that is Angela Avila who was struck by the defense, so. 
THE COURT: Well, there were an inordinate number 
of females in this whole panel. 
MR. MISNER: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: Now you're talking of, I suppose about 
Mr. Tidwell and Mr. Worley? 
MR. MISNER: Tidwell, Worley and Mr. Jensen were 
the three. 
THE COURT: And who struck Mr. Brown? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
JOHNSON: 
COURT: 
JOHNSON: 
MISNER: 
Who 
Brown? 
That 
That 
struck, I'm , 
was 
was 
defense 
defense. 
sorry. 
• 
That was our first 
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1 strike, Judge. 
2 THE COURT: You struck a male on him. How many 
3 males did you strike then? 
4 MR. MISNER: They've got one -
5 THE COURT: Mr. Misner? 
6 MR. MISNER: Yeah, I'm counting. 
7 MR. JOHNSON: We struck three as well, Your Honor. 
8 MR. MISNER: Yeah, they struck three males as well. 
9 MR. JOHNSON: I mean, we're prepared to state the 
10 grounds for that if there's a Batson challenge being made 
11 against that. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you each do that then? 
13 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, we have the same reason 
14 for striking all four of the people that we struck and that 
15 was that all four were single with no children, and our jury 
16 pool that we want on this case are married with children. 
17 THE COURT: And Mr. Johnson, can you address those? 
18 MR. JOHNSON: Sure, I can articulate with Mr. 
19 Worley. I was looking for somebody with some education, it 
20 wasn't there. Mr. Jensen is a CEO from Harmons. It was my 
21 personal opinion, and I think the detective shares that with 
22 me that he's got a lot bigger fish to fry and I don't think 
23 he would give it the necessary attention that we needed to 
24 today. Mr. Tidwell was just an individual that from the very 
25 I beginning, I mean, gut instinct was not a person that 
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1 impressed me with anything that he could really bring to the 
2 jury panel. And then the fourth that the State struck -
3 MR. MISNER: Is not at issue. 
4 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, so that was my rationale, Your 
5 Honor. 
6 MR. MISNER: Our rationale, Your Honor, just so I'm 
7 clear is that just on the three men, but all four of them 
8 that we struck is for the exact same reason, including Ms. 
9 Avila. 
10 (Off the record discussion) 
11 THE COURT: Okay, are you satisfied? 
12 MR. MISNER: Well, I think the record has been 
13 made, Your Honor, I think at this point the Court simply 
14 needs to decide either to uphold the panel or strike the 
15 panel. 
16 THE COURT: Oh, I understand. 
17 MR. MISNER: We're satisfied with whatever the 
18 Court's decision is. 
19 THE COURT: Well, I have reviewed my notes that I 
20 took during the jury voir dire. I've looked at the pattern 
21 and way in which the preemptories were exercised by both 
22 sides.. I do find that obviously it's a seven woman, one man 
23 jury, but based upon the reasons given and the conduct of 
24 both sides, I don't find a violation of Batson and jury is 
25 I constituted and the explanations given satisfy the Court that 
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1 this jury may proceed. 
2 MR. MISNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: The Court's in recess 
4 (Whereupon a recess was taken) 
5 THE COURT: We are back on the record in State 
6 versus Rosa-Re. All parties are present and the jury has 
7 returned and we thank you again for being here. 
8 Mr. Johnson? 
9 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please 
10 the Court, counsel. 
11 . Good morning. When Joshua Bolanos went to bed at 
12 10:00 on Monday, March 28th, he really didn't expect much 
13 other than a great night's sleep. Earlier that night he met 
14 the defendant, Dennis Rosa-Re, who was introduced to Joshua 
15 as a co-worker of his fathers. His dad is a long-haul truck 
16 driver. That's the first time he met him, and he was 
17 introduced to him and was told that Dennis was to spend the 
18 night because his dad was a long-haul truck driver and then 
19 the next morning, very early in the morning, both Dennis and 
20 his father were going to get up and drive truck. 
21 Joshua's going to [inaudible] sleep was interrupted 
22 with a horrible, horrible nightmare. He woke up to feel, as 
23 he will describe on the stand, as a vice grip, a pain on his 
24 penis. Startled he woke up and saw the defendant reaching 
25 underneath his shorts and actually physically grabbing his 
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1 After the ins t ruc t ions have been read, the State and the 
2 defense will once again have the opportuni ty to make c los ing 
3 s ta tements to you to tell you what they think the ev idence 
4 did show and why you should be persuaded or not be persuaded 
5 based on cer ta in elements of the evidence. 
6 As you try the case as jurors , you should remain 
7 alert and a t ten t ive and again not express an opin ion unti l 
8 all of the ev idence is in, until you 've been asked to do so 
9 by re t i r ing to the jury room not to discuss the case with 
10 anyone and not talk to the attorneys or read or rev iew 
11 anything else about the case. Okay, when I read your names , 
12 if you would p lease stand. 
13 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, pe rmiss ion to approach 
14 the bench? 
15 I THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. MISNER: I think given the se r iousness of the 
charges w e ' r e probably going to need the record to make a 
Batson c h a l l e n g e . Just wanted to make everybody aware 
because of the s ixteen perspective ju rors that we had left after 
the fo r -causes , four were men, three were, s t r i cken by the s ta te . 
MR. JOHNSON: Come again? 
MR. MISNER: We had four po ten t i a l male ju ro r s and 
you s t ruck th ree . 
MR. JOHNSON: Oh,well, 
MR. MISNER: So we just need the record . 
THE COURT: So, you also s t ruck a Hispan ic too . 
MR. MISNER: Yeah. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay, well that wasn ' t intent ional on my 
par t . 
MR. MISNER: Well, we jus t need to make a record and go 
th rough the . . . 
THE COURT: Okay, alr ight , we can do that . 
MR.MISNER:Okay. 
16 I THE COURT: Dorothy Faranakis , Janet Anderson , 
17 Tamara Solis , Judy Dearden, Connie Iverson, Janae Brochear , 
18 I Terry Pierce-Rich , Carl ( inaudible) . 
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AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Set. Ju (.Representatives Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation the 
provisions of this article. 
